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Abstract
The distributional incidence of growth is generally analyzed by com-
paring the quantiles of the pre- and post-growth income distribution -e.g.
the so-called Growth Incidence Curves. Such an approach based on an
implicit re-ranking of individual incomes ignores income mobility by as-
suming that only post-growth income matters in social welfare. By con-
trast, this paper takes the view that "status quo matters" and that social
welfare should logically be defined on both inital and terminal income.
This leads to consider ’non-anonymous’ Growth Incidence Curves that
plot income growth rates against the various quantiles of the initial dis-
tribution. Dominance criteria that generalize those available for standard
growth incidence curves are derived, which account for the inequality of
individual income growth rates, conditional on initial income. An applica-
tion to the cross-country distributional feature of global growth illustrates
the analysis.
1 Introduction
Growth incidence curves (GIC) are increasingly used to describe the distribu-
tional eﬀects of growth. They simply plot the mean growth rate of real income
in a population against income quantiles - see figure 1. A downard sloping GIC.
thus indicates that growth contributes to equalizing the distribution of income
and vice-versa for an upward sloping curve. Of course, the shape of GICs may
be very diverse. An important issue, therefore, is that of comparing diﬀerent
∗Paper prepared for the Conference "Inequality: new directions", Cornell University and
London School of Economics, Ithaca 11-13 September 2009. I thank the participants to the
conference for very helpful comments.
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GIC. Under which circumstances, is it possible to say that a growth episode or
its GIC is "better" than another, and what is the meaning of such a statement?
Answers to that question have been provided by Ravallion and Chen (2003)
and Son (2004). They essentially rely on applying first-order and second-order
dominance criteria - Atkinson (1970) - to the terminal distribution of income.
For instance, first order dominance implies that the GIC of a growth spell is
everywhere above that of another. Second order dominance requires the mean
growth rate of the p poorest in a growth episode - or the ’p-cumulative GIC’ -
be everywhere larger than in another.
These results are quite intutitive. Growth may be thought as a specific re-
distribution process, which can be analyzed with the standard tools of income
redistribution analysis - i.e. tax-benefit incidence. In particular, GICs are very
similar to tax progressivity charts whereas cumulative GIC bears some resem-
blance with "concentration curves". 1
On second thought, there is a diﬀerence, though. It lies in the horizontal axis
of GICs. In standard redistribution analysis, individuals are ranked according to
their position in the initial distribution of income.and the incidence curve shows
how much their income is modified by redistribution. An important issue that
arises in this context is that of the ’re-ranking’ of individuals by the redistrib-
ution system. Many results on the relativive "progressivity’ of a redistribution
system vis-a-vis another are valid only if there is no re-ranking of individuals -
see Lambert (1993) for instance.
GICs compares the income of individuals which were not necessarily in the
same initial position. The cumulative GIC shows the diﬀerence between the
initial income of those individuals who are initially among the p poorest and
the income of the p poorest individuals in the terminal distribution. They are
not necessarily the same individuals. As redistribution analysis when it excludes
re-ranking, GICs somehow ignore the issue of income mobility. Yet, GICs may
have diﬀerent shapes depending on whether mean growth rates are measured
before or after the re-ranking of the population - see figure 3 below.
The present paper analyzes the distributional incidence of growth using the
initial distribution as a reference, which leads to define ’non-anonymous’ Growth
Incidence Curves (na-GIC). This extension of the original analysis of the distri-
butional features of growth logically leads to taking into account the full joint
distribution of individual initial incomes and terminal incomes, or equivalently,
initial income and income growth, or income change As with GICs, the goal is
to define dominance criteria of a growth path over another. Reasonably enough,
the comparison is restricted to growth paths with the same initial distribu-
tion, which we shall then call ’growth processes’ by analogy with the ’income
processes’ defined by Benabou and Ok ( 2001).
Results similar to dominance criteria with GICs are obtained when social
welfare functions are defined exclusively on final income. But things are diﬀerent
when it is recognized that "status quo matters", or, in other words, social welfare
is defined on the bi-dimensional distribution of both initial and terminal incomes
1This analogy is also discussed in Jenkins and van Kern (2006).
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as assumed in part of the literature on income mobility - e.g. Atkinson (1983),
Chakravrty et al. (1985), Dardanoni (1993) or Gottschalk and Spolaore (2003)
among others. In that case, it is shown that the GIC dominance criteria has
to be complemented by more restrictive criteria. In particular, social welfare
dominance requires not only dominance of the cumulative na-GICs but also that
of "inequality corrected cumulative na-GICs". Although a direct application
of the sequential dominance criterion obtained by Atkinson and Bourguignon
(1986), these criteria do not seem to ever have been made explicit. 2
Several authors already pointed to the diﬀerence that it makes to re-rank
income earners or not to re-rank them in drawing growth incidence curves and
in comparing growth spells. In analyzing the pro-poorness of growth in diﬀer-
ent countries based on panel data on individual incomes Jenkins and van Kern
(2006, 2008) or Grimm (2007) have shown how diﬀerent conclusions were ob-
tained when using standard GICs and what we call in this paper non-anonymous
GICs. If they discussed the issue of dominance of one growth episode over an-
other based on non-anonymous GIC, however, they do not deal with the full
implications of taking simultaneously into account both initial and terminal
incomes in the evaluation of social welfare.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section recalls the basic results
about GIC dominance relying on simple empirical examples based on the cross-
country distribution of global growth in diﬀerent periods. Section 3 presents
suﬃcient and necessary conditions for the dominance of one growth process
over another for general classes of social welfare functions defined on initial in-
come and income change and for a given initial ditribution of income. These
conditions imply in turn dominance criteria for na-GICs and for an extension of
na-GIC that takes into accoun the inequality of income changes conditionally
on initial income. Links with GIC dominance are also discussed. The analysis
is conducted with continuous distributions and is shown to combine standard
one-dimensional dominance results in the terminal income space and income-
mobility specific criteria. Section 4 illustrates those various dominance condi-
tions with a comparison of the cross-country structure of global economic growth
in two recent periods using the 1995 distribution of world income as common
initial reference. The concluding section summarizes the various results in the
paper.
2 Alternative representations of the distributional
incidence of growth
Let the initial distribution of income in the economy being studied be described
by its density, f(y), and cumulative distribution function F (y), with support
(0, a). Growth takes place over some time period. Its distributional impact may
2Fields et al. (2002) refer explicitly to stochastic dominance of a distribution of income
changes over another, but they do not relate it to initial incomes.
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be described by the conditional distribution function, eΦ(z | y) of terminal in-
comes, z, conditionally on initial incomes y. Finally, let Φ(z) be the marginal
distribution of income at terminal time implied by eΦ( ). We are interested in
comparing two growth paths described by the transition functions eΦ( ) andeΦ∗( ) and their corresponding terminal distributions Φ(z) and Φ∗(z). Unless
specified otherwise, we shall assume that the two growth paths have the same
initial distribution, F (y).
Growth incidence curves are defined on the initial and terminal distributions
of income. Define the ’quantile function’, yF (p) as the inverse of the cumulative
density F ():
yF (p) ⇐⇒ p = F (y)
and similarly for the terminal distribution Φ() or Φ∗(). The Growth Incidence
Curve corresponding to the growth path Φ may then be defined (Ravallion and
Chen, 2003) as:
gΦF (p) =
yΦ(p)
yF (p)
− 1
It simply shows the rate of growth of the pth quantile of the distribution. The
distributional impact of growth is thus represented through the inverse of the
cumulative distribution functions rather than those functions themselves.
An obvious property of the GIC is First Order Dominance. Assume that the
terminal distribution Φ() first order dominates (FOD) that of the alternative
growth path Φ∗( ). In other words, the (additive) social welfare associated with
Φ() is larger or equal to that associated with Φ∗( ) for all individual income
utility functions that are increasing. It is well known that this is equivalent
to Φ(z) ≤ Φ∗(z) for all z. This in turn implies that the GIC associated with
growth path eΦ must be everywhere above that corresponding to growth patheΦ∗, as long, of course, as initial distributions are the same on the two growth
paths. Formally:
Φ() FOD Φ∗() ⇐⇒ Φ(z) ≤ Φ∗(z) ∀z ⇐⇒ gΦF (p) ≥ gΦ∗F (p) ∀p
Second order social welfare dominance (SOD) refers to individual utility
functions that are increasing and concave in income. It is equivalent to the
integral of the cumulative density function Φ() being no larger than the integral
of Φ∗( ). In turn, we know this is equivalent to the mean income of the p poorest,
or the ’generalized Lorenz curve’, being no smaller with Φ() than with Φ∗() for
all p. Using quantile functions, the Generalized Lorenz curve can be expressed
as : eLΦ(p) = Z p
0
yΦ(q)dq
Using the GIC, this can be rewritten as:
eLΦ(p) = Z p
0
[gΦF (q) + 1] yF (q)dq =
Z p
0
gΦF (q)yF (q)dq + eLF (p)
4
Comparing social welfare associated with two growth paths Φ and Φ∗, we thus
have:
Φ() SOD Φ∗() ⇐⇒
Z p
0
xΦ(q)dq ≥
Z p
0
xΦ∗(q)dq for all p
where xΦ(q) is the absolute - rather than relative - change in quantile income
q over the growth path Φ, and similarly for Φ∗. Equivalently, this relationship
may also be expressed in terms of the ’p-cumulative’ GIC, GΦF () defined by:
GΦF (p) =
R p
0
gΦ(q)yF (q)dqR p
0
yF (q)dq
Second order dominance then requires that GΦF (p) ≥ GΦ∗F (p) for all p - see
Son (2004).
Empirical illustrations in this paper are based on the global distribution
of income per capita, with equal weight given to all countries.3 Income is as-
similated to GDP per capita. Data are drawn from the World Development
Indicators (World Bank, 2009). Figure 1a shows the GIC curve of the global
economy for the 1995-2002 period. To illustrate the comparison of growth paths
discussed above, figure 1 also shows the GIC curve that would have been ob-
tained for the same 1995-02 period had country growth rates over that period
been those observed between 2002 and 2007. 4 It can be seen that there is no
first order dominance because the mean income of the two upper deciles did not
grow as fast in 2002-07 as in 1995-02. Figure 1b shows the p-cumulative growth
incidence curves for the two periods. It can be checked there that second order
dominance holds. In other words, social welfare would have been higher in 2002
with the 2002-07 growth rates than with the actual 1995-02 growth rates for all
social welfare functions based on increasing and concave country income utility
functions.
In the preceding example, it is important to stress that the comparison of
two growth spells in the global economy is done using the same base year. Of
course, it would be possible to define GICs for 1995-02 on the one hand and
for 2002-07, using 2002 as initial year, on the other hand. Two remarks are in
order in this respect. First, the shape of the 2002-07 GIC with 2002 as initial
year is not the same as the 2002-07 GIC when 1995 is used as a base year as
above - the 2002-07 growth rates being applied to 1995 country incomes. This
is illustrated on Figure 2. Second, it must be clear that the FOD and SOD
dominance results apply only when the initial distributions of the two growth
paths being compared are the same. The GICs for 1995-02 and for 2002-07, with
2002 as a base year, can be compared but the comparison has little meaning in
terms of social welfare.
3This is what Milanovic (2005) called ’inter-country’ rather than ’global’ distribution. Here
we shall use the two terms interchangeably.
4 In that comparison, the initial distribution is indeed the same -i.e. the 1995 distribution-
for the two growth paths being compared as specified above.
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An ambiguity in interpreting GICs comes from the fact that the quantiles on
the horizontal axis do not comprise the same statistical units. For instance, the
1995-02 GIC in figure 1a compares the mean income of the various deciles of the
1995 and 2002 distributions but the country composition of these deciles has
changed during that time intervall. CICs thus are ’anonymous’ in the sense that
the composition of the various quantiles of the distribution does not matter. For
instance, Uganda and Tanzania moved out of the first decile whereas Eritrea and
Madagascar moved in. If one is interested in whether global growth has been
pro-poor between 1995 and 2002 there does not seem to be any good reason for
ignoring what happened to countries that grew fast enough to move out of the
bottom deciles.
An alternative to the GIC approach to the distributional features of growth
consists of keeping the ranking of statistical units constant , whereas comparing
the initial and terminal quantile functions , yF (p) and , yΦ(p), as done before is
equivalent to re-ranking them. The no-reranking approach to the distributional
incidence of growth then associates to every quantile in the initial income dis-
tribution yF (p) the terminal incomes Z(p) of individual units in that quantile.
The corresponding Growth Incidence Curve becomes ’non-anonymous’ since
it it now possible to put a name on each point of the curve. Formally, non-
anonymous Growth Incidence Curves (na-GIC)5 can be defined by:
eg(p) = R ao zdeΦ(z | yF (p))
yF (p)
− 1
In other words, the na-GIC associates to every quantile in the initial distribution
the mean income growth of all individual units in that quantile. Likewise, the
cumulative na-GIC curve may be defined as:
eG(p) = R p0 eg(q)yF (q)dqR p
0
yF (q)dq
Figure 3a plots the modified GIC for the 1995-2002 gobal growth spell and
compares it to the original GIC. The discrepancy between both curves is striking.
The same is true of the cumulative modified and original GICs in figure 3b. In
eﬀect, the diﬀerence is such that comparing two diﬀerent growth paths might
well lead to diﬀerent conclusions about their distributional impact depending
on whether one does or does not re-rank the statistical units between the initial
and the terminal year.The main diﬀerences between the GIC and the na-GIC
in figure 3a comes from the fact that, between 1995 and 2002, India and Bosnia
moved up from the third to the fourth decile of the distribution. The fast growth
of these two countries is explicitly taken into account in the 3rd decile of the
na-GIC whereas it is somewhat hidden in the change in the composition of the
3rd and 4th decile in the standard GIC. 6
5Jenkins and van Kern (2008) and van Kern (2009) refer to the same curves as "mobility
profiles".
6A paradoxical situation is that described in Robilliard et al. (2006) about the simulation
6
It remains now to see whether the simple dominance criteria in comparing
the standard GICs or cumulative GICs have some counterpart with na-GICs
and whether they make any diﬀerence when comparing diﬀerent growth paths.
3 The bi-dimensional approach: dominance cri-
teria when simultaneously accounting for ini-
tial and terminal incomes
As the preceding example shows the issue in evaluating the distributional impact
of growth would seem to be whether the analysis must refer to the initial or the
terminal situation of individuals or countries. If we are interested in pro-poor
growth, should pro-poorness be measured comparing the poor in the initial
and terminal distributions or should those individuals or countries that escaped
poverty be taken into account? Interestingly enough, this issue is related to the
length of the growth spell that is analyzed. In the preceding example, India was
in the bottom three deciles of the global distribution in 1995. It is not anymore
in 2002. Therefore, it is not included in the calculation of the mean growth rate
of the bottom three deciles with the GIC approach. But, of course, it would
have been included if the analysis had focused on a much shorter time period,
say 1995-96. Ignoring the initial situation of observations therefore is equivalent
with ignoring the time path between the initial and the terminal time of the
period under analysis. This may be fine if the goal of the analysis is only to
describe distributional changes between the initial and terminal points. It may
not so if it is to evaluate social welfare along alternative growth paths.
This section considers the general case where social welfare depends on both
initial and terminal incomes, or equivalently, initial income and income change.
The case where social welfare depends solely on terminal income, which corre-
sponds to the GIC approach, is a particular case of this general specification.
3.1 Decomposing the diﬀerence between two growth paths
into initial and transitional distribution diﬀerencesh
paths
Now that the analytical framework is explicilty bi-dimensional, it is possible to
deal rigorously with the issue of comparing growth paths with diﬀerent initial
distrbutions. Consider then two growth paths described by the joint density
of the distributional eﬀects of the 1997 crisis in Indonesia. The standard GIC curve suggests
the crisis has been strongly regressive with poor people more severely aﬀected than others,
whereas the na-GIC for the same simulation data set points to the crisis being "progressive",
initially poor people having done on average better tan the others.
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functions of initial and terminal incomes: ω(y, z) and ω∗(y, z).One way or an-
other, what matters is the diﬀerence between these two functions. With the
same notations as above this can be written as:
∆ω(y, z) = ω(y, z)− ω∗(y, z). = f(y).eΦ(z | y)− f∗(y).eΦ∗(z | y)
Then, a natural decomposition of that diﬀerence is:
∆ω(y, z) = f(y).∆eΦ(z | y) + .eΦ∗(z | y)∆f(y) (1)
where ∆eΦ(z | y) = eΦ(z | y)− eΦ∗(z | y) and ∆f(y) = f(y)− f∗(y).
A this stage, it is convenient to refer to ∆ω(y, z) as the diﬀerence in ’growth
paths’ and to ∆eΦ(z | y) as the diﬀerence in ’growth processes’. The idea here is
that a growth path is the combination of a growth process -essentially a tran-
sitional or conditional density function - with an initial distribution. The first
part of ( 1) is the contribution to the diﬀerence in growth paths of the ’growth
processes’, i.e. densities of terminal income conditional on intitial income. The
second part is the contribution of the diﬀerence in initial distributions for a
given growth process. To the extent that growth processes may be considered
independently from initial distributions, then it is the first part of (1) that mat-
ters. Hence the focus on growth paths with identical initial distributions in
the preceding section, or the imposition of a given initial distribution for the
comparison of two growth processes.
This choice of focusing on growth paths with identical initial distributions
is important for social welfare comparisons. Considering simultaneously initial
and terminal incomes within a social welfare dominance context can be done
using the general bi-dimensional framework proposed by Atkinson and Bour-
guignon ( 1982). But, if the point is to compare growth paths with the same
initial distribution, then simpler and more powerful criteria derived in Atkin-
son and Bourguignon (1986) can be used. The latter paper was referring to
the comparison of two income distributions among households with diﬀerent
needs, the distribution of needs itself being constant. In the present context,
that framework would be equivalent to replace ’needs’ by ’initial income..
In what follows, we briefly recall the results obtained in this latter paper,
show how they apply to the present case and derive simple necessary conditions
for dominance of one growth process over another that seem of practical use.
Before doing this, however, some remarks are in order about the concept of social
welfare dominance in two dimensions and the shape of social welfare functions
to be used.
3.2 Defining welfare dominance among growth paths
Formally, the problem is to compare two growth processes given by the condi-
tional distributions eΦ(z | y) and eΦ∗(z | y) where z stand for terminal income
and y for initial income. The initial distribution of income is given by the cumu-
lative density function F (y). Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) suggested that
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such comparison could be made by considering social welfare functions where
individual utilities would depend on both initial and terminal income. This idea
was analyzed further by Atkinson (1983) when analyzing mobility - assuming
identical marginal distribution of terminal incomes too - and at a later stage
by Dardanoni (1993) and Gottsshalk and Spolaore (2003) among others. Other
authors had suggested to define social welfare on permanent incomes - see for
instance Shorrocks (1978) or Chakravarty et al. (1985).7 The same perspective
is adopted in what follows, except for the fact that, for analytical convenience,
individual utility functions are specified as functions of initial income, y, and
change in income, x (= z − y) with support [−a, a].
Let Ψ(x | y) and Ψ∗(x | y) be the corresponding conditional distributions
over the growth processes being compared and
∆Ψ(x | y) = Ψ(x | y)−Ψ∗(x | y)
the diﬀerence between them. Denoting the utility an individual draws from
his/her own growth process by u(y, x), the diﬀerence in overall social welfare
between the two growth paths is defined as:
∆W =
Z a
0
Z a
−a
u(y, x)d∆Ψ(x | y)dF (y) (2)
or, using quantile functions for the common marginal distribution F ():
∆W =
Z 1
0
Z a
−a
u [y(p), x] d∆Ψ(x | y(p))dp (3)
Welfare dominance of growth process eΦ over eΦ∗ holds in the sense of a family of
utility functions, V , if ∆W ≥ 0 for all utility functions u( ) belonging to family
V : eΦ %V eΦ∗ ⇐⇒ ∆W ≥ 0 ∀u ∈ V
An interesting property readily apparent in (2) and (3) is that the dominance
of a growth process over another in general depends on the initial distribution
of income. It is thus posible that the growth process eΦ dominates the processeΦ∗ for a given initial distribution F () but not for another.
3.3 Social welfare functions
Families of social welfare functions may be defined by restrictions imposed on
the marginal utility of income change, x In eﬀect, this is equivalent to imposing
restrictions on the marginal utility of terminal income. Three families of func-
tions will be considered depending on the number of restrictions imposed on the
marginal utility of income change.
7See the survey by Fields and Ok ( 2001) and also the recent paper by Fields (2009).
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In the first family, V0, utility functions are only required to have positive
marginal utilities of income change:
V0 = {u; ux ≥ 0}
Nothe that no restriction is imposed on the marginal utility of initial income.
This is because the two growth paths being compared have the same distribution
of initial income so that no comparison has to be perfomed in that dimension.
As no restriction is imposed on the way utility depends on initial income, this
family of functions should lead to ’partial first order’ dominance’ relationships.
A more restrictive family of social welfare functions requires the marginal
utility of income change to decline with initial income. In other words, a drop
in income is more painful the poorer people initially are and likewise an increase
in income brings more additional utility the richer they are.
V1 = {u; ux ≥ 0, uxy ≤ 0}
Although still no restriction is imposed on the marginal utility of initial income,
this family of utility functions leads to the equivalent of first order dominance
conditions in the uni-dimensional case because restrictions on utility functions
are still limited to the first derivative of the utility function with repect to
income change. To distinguish it from the previous case, it is conveninent to
refer to dominance conditions defined by V1 as ’full first-order dominance’.
Second order dominance may be obtained by imposing restrictions on the
second derivative of utility with respect to income changes. In this respect, a
sensible family of social welfare functions is:
V2 = {u; ux ≥ 0, uxx ≥ 0, uxy ≤ 0, uyxx ≥ 0}
The marginal utility of income change is thus required to decline with the income
change itself, a rather standard requirement, but this decline is supposed to be
slower when initial income rises. The general intuition behind this is the same
as for V1. It is essentially that utility depends less and less on income change as
initial income rises. The marginal utility of a given income change is lower for
higer initial incomes in V1 (first order) and it declines more slowly with income
change in V2 (second order).
It must be noted that both families V1 and V2 include utility functions that
depend solely on terminal income, that is functions of the form:
u(y, x) = h(y + x)
V1 requires functions h() to be increasing and concave, whereas V2 requires
in addition its third derivative to be positive. It can thus be said that dom-
inance criteria based on V1 will necessarily be consistent with the standard
uni-dimensional dominance analysis where utility is assumed to depend solely
on terminal income. However, V2 introduces the additional restriction that the
third derivative of h() must be positive.8 For the same reason, it can be said
8 In the uni-dimensional case, restrictions on the third derivatives of the utility functions
are equivalent to the ’transsfer sensitivity’ axiom used by Shorrocks and Foster (1987) to
generalize standard Lorenz dominance to cases where the Lorenz curves cross each other.
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that both V1 and V2 are consistent with the well-known Pigou-Dalton principle,
but, of course add further restrictions to social welfare.
A much more general family of utility functions that belong to V1 and V2 is
given by the following CES-like family of functions::
u(y, x) = [ayα + b(y + x)α]β with α, β ∈ [0, 1] and a, b ≥ 0. (4)
Somehow, this functional form generalizes the standard permanent income hy-
pothesis. In that expression, initial an terminal incomes are indeed substitutes
but not necessarily perfect substitutes (case α = 1).
3.4 Dominance criteria
We now state the dominance criteria corresponding to the three preceding fam-
ilies of social welfare functions.
3.4.1 Partial first-order dominance
Given the absence of any restriction on the way utility depends on initial in-
come, the family of social welfare functions V0 simply leads to the standard
unidimensional first-order criterion for evey value of initial income.eΦ %V0 eΦ∗ ⇐⇒ ∆Wu ≥ 0 ∀u ∈ V0 ⇐⇒ ∆Ψ(x | yF (p)) ≤ 0 ∀x, p (5)
3.4.2 Full first-order dominance
Applying directly the results in Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) with a con-
tinuous rather than a discrete specification for the dimension with the same
marginal distribution leads to the following dominance condition.eΦ % V1 eΦ∗ ⇐⇒ ∆Wu ≥ 0 ∀u ∈ V1 ⇐⇒ (6)
∆Θ(x, p) =
1
p
Z p
0
∆Ψ(x | yF (q))dq ≤ 0 ∀x, p
In that expression, the function Θ(x, p) is simply the cumulative density func-
tion of the income change x for the p smallest initial incomes, or the p-cumulative
distribution function of the income change. This is the straight generalization
of the first order dominance results in a single dimension to two dimensions.
The partial first-order dominance criterion was leading to a comparison of the
cumulative density fucntions of income change conditionally on initial income.
The full first-order dominance criterion lead to the comparison of the cumulative
density functions in both the income change and the initial income dimensions.
It can be seen that full first-order dominance is less demanding that partial
first-order dominance since it is now possible not to have dominance in the sense
of (5) for some values of initial income but to have it in the sense of (6) when
integrating along the initial income dimension.
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3.4.3 Second-order dominance
The full first-order dominance criteria (6) is still very demanding since it requires
the cumulative distribution function of one growth path to be everywhere below
that of another. Intuitively, this property must certainly hold for low initial
income levels and low income changes, but not so much for high levels of initial
income or income changes. The second order dominance criterion based on the
family V2 of welfare functions weakens that requirement by allowing cumulative
density functions of the growth paths being compared to cross each other.eΦ % V2 eΦ∗ ⇐⇒ ∆Wu ≥ 0 ∀u ∈ V2 ⇐⇒ (7)
∆H(x, p) =
Z x
−a
∆Θ(z, p)dz ≤ 0 ∀x ∈ [−a, a] and ∀p ∈ [0, 1]
In this expression H(x, p) is the integral of the cumulative function Θ(x, p) with
respect to income change. It is well-known since Atkinson (1970) and Shorrocks
(1983) that the conditions ∆H(x, p) ≤ 0 is strictly equivalent to Generalized
Lorenz dominance. In the present case, given the fact that the income change
may take negative values the concept of "incomplete change" is preferred to the
generalized Lorenz curve. The following equivalence can easily be shown:
∆H(x, p) =
Z x
−a
∆Θ(z, p)dz ≤ 0 ∀x ∈ [−a, a] and ∀p ∈ [0, 1] ⇐⇒ (8)
X(q, p) ≥ X∗(q, p) ∀p, q ∈ [0, 1]
where X(q, p) (resp X∗(q, p)) is the income gain among the p poorest individ-
uals in terms of initial income and, among them, the q poorest in terms of
income change. X and X∗ are referred to as the ’p-cumulative incomplete in-
come change’. The word ’incomplete’ refers here to the fact that only a fraction
q among the p poorest are taken into acccount. Formally, it is given by:
X(q, p) =
Z Z(q,p)
−a
zΘz(z, p)dz with Θ [Z(q, p), p] = q
and equivalently forX∗, whereΘz(z, p) is the density function of the distribution
of income changes for the p poorest in terms of initial income.
3.5 Some necessary conditions for dominance
Both (6) and (7) criteria compare manyfolds associated with growth paths. Dom-
inance is achieved when one manyfold is everywhere above or below another.
These manyfolds may not be very convenient to perform actual comparisons of
growth paths, but it is always possible to restrict the comparison to a few values
of p, q or x as done below in figure 5.
If this is found to be too cumbersome, it is still possible to focus on a few
indirect indicators of the relative position of these manyfolds. Some interesting
necessary conditions for dominance of one growth path over another can be
derived in this way.
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First, notice that by integrating below the Θ(x, p) manyfold, first order
dominance requires that the p-cumulative mean income changes be higher on the
dominating growth path for all values of p. This is also a requirement for second
order dominance when considering the intersection of the X(q, p) manyfold with
the q = 1 plane.eΦ ºV1 or V2 eΦ∗ =⇒ X(1, p) ≥ X∗(1, p) ∀p ∈ [0, 1] (9)
This condition has a direct relationship with the na-GICs associated with eΦ andeΦ∗as will be seen below.
Second, integrating below the p-cumulative incomplete mean income change
curves, X(q, p) with respect to q provides another necessary condition for second
order dominance. Figure 4 shows the p-cumulative incomplete income change
curve, X(q, p), for a given value of p. Integrating below this curve from the
lower bound of income changes −a, one obtains an area with size A(p). The
same could be done for the growth path eΦ∗ leading to an area of size A∗(p). If
growth path eΦ dominates eΦ∗ in V2, then (8) implies that A(p) ≥ A∗(p) for all
p.
Another way of expressing this necessary condition for second order domi-
nance of eΦ over eΦ∗ is as follows. In figure 4 it can be seen that :
A(p) = X(1, p)/2 + a− S(p) (10)
where S(p) is the area between the bisector and the p-cumulative incomplete
income change curve. Clearly, S(p) depends on the degree of inequality of the
distribution of income changes. If they were all equal then the incomplete
income change curve would simply be the bisector and S(p) would be 0. By
analogy with the Gini coeﬃcient, one can thus define an inequality index for
the distribution of x as:
Γ(p) = 2.S(p)/X(1, p) (11)
Combining (10) and (11) the necessary condition A(p) ≥ A∗(p) for the sec-
ond order dominance of eΦ over eΦ∗becomes:
X(1, p) [1− Γ(p)] ≥ X∗(1, p) [1− Γ∗(p)] ∀p ∈ [0, 1] (12)
According to (12)dominance of eΦ over eΦ∗requires not only that the p-
cumulative mean income changes be higher for the dominating growth path
but that this property still holds when mean income changes have been cor-
rected by a term that takes into account the inequality in the distribution of
income changes. One can thus refer to (12) as a condition on ’inequality-corrected
p-cumulative mean income changes’.
A problem with this inequality corrected mean income change is that it may
be negative. Indeed, it can be seen on figure 4 that the area S(p) may be larger
than X(1, p)/2, which implies that the inequality coeﬃcient Γ(p) may be larger
than unity. This is essentially due to the fact that inequality is defined here
on a variable that can take negative values. However, to the extent that what
matters is the comparison between two growth processes, the sign of inequality
corrected mean income changes may not be that important.
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3.6 Dominance criteria and growth incidence curves
We now can get back to the Growth Incidence Curves and examine the impli-
cations of the the preceding social welfare criteria. Equivalence between the
dominance criteria or some of the preceding necessary conditions and na-GIC
curves is rather staightforward.
First, partial first-order dominance implies dominance of na-GIC curves.
Noting x(p) and x∗(p) the income change means of the two growth paths for
the pth quantile of the initial income distribution. The na-GIC curves are given
respectively by x(p)/y(p) and x∗(p)/y(p). As partial first-order dominance (5)
requires the conditional cdf of income change to be lower along the dominating
growth path, this implies the income change means to be larger on that path:eΦ % V0 eΦ∗ ⇐⇒ ∆Ψ(x | yF (p)) ≤ 0 ∀x, p =⇒eg(p) = x(p)/y(p) ≥ eg∗(p) = x∗(p)/y(p) ∀p
Second, both full-first-order and second-order dominance imply p-cumulative
na-GIC dominance. This is the necessary condition (9) seen above. To extend
that condition to p-cumulative na-GIC curves, it is only necessary to divide the
p-cumulative income change means by the p-cumulative initial income means,
Y (p) defined by:
Y (p) =
Z p
0
yF (q)dq
The following implication then holds:eΦ º V1 or V2 eΦ∗ =⇒ X(1, p) ≥ X∗(1, p) ∀p ∈ [0, 1] =⇒eG(p) = X(1, p)/Y (p) ≥ eG∗(p) = X∗(1, p)/Y (p)
Third, second-order dominance leads to an extension of p-cumulative na-
GIC curves that takes into account the inequality in the distribution of income
changes. These inequality-corrected p-cumulative na-GIC curves, G(p), are de-
fined by:
G(p) = eG(p). [1− Γ(p).]
and the following implication holds:eΦ ºV2 eΦ∗ =⇒ G(p) ≥ G∗(p)
Conceptually, this extension of na-GIc curves is important because it intro-
duces a notion of ’income mobility’ or ’horizontal inequality’ into the description
of the distributional features of growth. Standard GICs compare the distribu-
tion of terminal income and thus refer implicitly to the change in vertical in-
equality associated with growth. na-GICs account for income mobility but focus
on mean income changes conditionally on initial income. Inequality-corrected
na-GICs introduce horizontal inequality into the descriptyion of growth. Two
growth paths may have the same p-cumulative na-GIC curves and quite dif-
ferent inequality-corrected p-cumulative na-GIC curves, indicating that there is
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more disparity in individual growth rates for given initial income in one path.
That path could not dominate the other in the sense of V2.
A last point to be scrutinized is the relationship between the dominance
criteria stated above and standard GICs. It has been seen that all families of
social welfare functions defined on initial income and income change included
social welfare functions defined on terminal income only. It should thus be the
case that dominance criteria established in this section imply uni-dimensional
dominance criteria which lie behind standard GICs.
This is easily checked. Consider for instance the partial first-order domi-
nance criterion (5). The cumulative density function of terminal income, Φ(),
associated with the conditional cdf of income changes Ψ(x | y) is given by:
Φ(z) =
1Z
0
Ψ(x | y(p))dp
It follows that the partial first-order dominance criterion (5) implies first order
dominance of the distribution of terminal income on growth path eΦ over patheΦ∗. In turn this implies GIC dominance, i.e. gΦF (p) ≥ gΦ∗F (p). The same
result can be proven for full first-order or second-order dominance. They imply
dominance of cumulative GICs defined on terminal incomes.
4 An empirical illustration with the global dis-
tribution of income
To illustrate the preceding criteria, we use again the change in the global dis-
tribution of income by country, comparing the 1995-02 period with what would
have been the growth path if growth rates had been during that period what
they have actually been between 2002 and 2007. Thus, the comparison between
the two growth paths is made using the same initial income distribution as a
reference, in accordance with a previous argument in this paper.
Figure 5 shows the na-GIC by 1995 income decile for the two growth processes.
Despite the fact that the overall average growth rate has been larger in 2002-07,
there is no partial first order dominance in the sense of (5), since the two curves
in figure 5a cross each other. The annual growth rate in the 9th 1995 decile is
lower along the 2002-07 growth path. On the basis of the p-cumulative na-GIC
curves shown in figure 5b, there is no reason to reject full first order dominance
in the sense of (6).
Moving now to second-order dominance in the sense of (7), figure 6 shows
the projections of the incomplete income gain manyfold, X(q, p), on the q plane
for selected values of p. For the ease of comparison with other charts, incomplete
income gains are normalized by the mean 1995 income of the p deciles. So, the
ordinate of the various curves at q = 100% for the various values of p corresponds
to the mean income change shown on the p-cumulative na-GICs in figure 5b.
Figure 6 suggests that second-order dominance holds. Indeed, the incomplete
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income gain curves X(q, p) are everywhere higher for 2002-07 than for 1995-02,
for all values of p being considered.
It logically follows from this that dominance must also hold for inequality-
corrected p-cumulative na-GICs. Those curves are shown in figure 7 and this is
indeed the case. Note on this figure that the inequality-corrected p-cumulative
na-GIC is negative for the first decile of the distribution in 1995-02. In other
words, the inequality coeﬃcient, Γ(.1), turns out to be negative on that growth
path, indicating a higher degree of inequality of gowth rates among the 10 per
cent poorest countries according to 1995 incomes. In eﬀect, it can be checked
that the coeﬃcient of variation of income gains is indeed lower for the poorest
countries, as of 1995.
This example shows that the dominance criteria derived in the preceding
section are not so restrictive as to prevent full dominance when comparing al-
ternative growth paths for the global economy. Alternatively, one may wonder
whether the record mean growth rate observed during 2002-07 is not suﬃcient
for dominance to hold whatever the country structure of growth behind that
mean. The simple simulation reported in figure 8 shows that this is not the
case.
The simulation consists of keeping the overall mean growth rate of the 2002-
07 period constant while increasing the dispersion of growth rates across coun-
tries. In eﬀect, growth rates are artificially modified applying the following mean
preserving spread rule:
gi → g + S(gi − g) + ui
where gi is the growth rate of country i, g the overall growth rate of the global
economy, S a scale factor arbitrarily set to 1.8 and ui a corrective term ensuring
that full first-order dominance holds for the poorest countries while mean growth
is preserved. This transformation is equivalent to increasing the inequality of
income changes or growth-related income mobility. In other words, countries
which initially (i.e. 1995) were close to each other in terms of income find them-
selves more distant, and presumably at more distant ranks of the global income
distribution in the terminal year of the period considered.
Figure 8b shows that the simulated 2002-07 growth path still dominates
1995-02 when considering p-cumulative na-GICs. However, figure 8c shows that
dominance does not hold anymore when considering the inequality-corrected p-
cumulative na-GICs. It follows that there cannot be dominance in terms of the
incomplete income change (12) or the social welfare criterion (7).
This example illustrates the diﬀerent meaning of the p-cumulative and the
inequality corrected p-cumulative na-GICs. Even though these are only neces-
sary conditions for dominance of a growth path over another, whether one is
satisfied and the other is not gives some indication on the way the structure of
growh aﬀects overall dominance. If (9) holds and not (12) then the reason for
no dominance is likely to come from more inequality in growth rates for initially
close observations. In the opposite case, no dominance is more likely to be due
to a lower overall mean growth rate. But, of course, a complete diagnosis can
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only be obtained by considering the whole p-cumuative incomplete income gain
curves, X(q, p).
5 Conclusion
This paper extended the concept of Growth Incidence Curve to that of non-
anonymous Growth Incidence Curves where growth is evaluated for the various
quantiles of the initial distribution of income without any re-ranking. This simple
extension of the original growth incidence framework leads to considering simul-
taneously initial and terminal incomes in evaluating growth, or equivalently to
explicitly introducing income mobility into the description of the distributional
features of growth.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a rigorous bi-dimensional
framework for the social welfare evaluation of growth, under the assumption that
both terminal and initial incomes enter individual welfare. Bi-dimensional social
welfare dominance criteria obtained in previous work have been adapted to this
particular case and some interesting necessary conditions have been derived that
compare growth processes on the basis of diﬀerent definitions of non-anonymous
growth incidence curves. Of special relevance is the ’inequality-corrected cumu-
lative non-anonymous growth incidence curve’ where the mean income growth
of the various quantiles of the initial distribution are scaled down by a factor
that depends negatively on the degree of inequality of income changes within
these quantiles. This simple dominance criterion thus takes into account changes
in vertical inequality but also horizontal inequality, that is diﬀerences among
people who are initially in the same situation.
Applying such criteria to evaluate growth clearly requires the availability
of panel data on individual incomes. The empirical application in this paper
relies on a particular panel which is the cross-country distribution of GDP per
capita. It helped illustrating the various concepts being discussed, but it may
be considered as too specific, especially in view of the fact that population
weights were simply ignored. Other authors have worked on panel data of
individual incomes in particular countries at various points of time and it might
be interesting to study the properties of the instruments proposed in the present
paper in this kind of framework.
Another field of application is the modeling of tax-benefit reforms. Typi-
cally, the distributional aspects of these reforms are analyzed through ’micro-
simulation’ techniques which simulate the income of every individual in a data
base if a given reform were to be implemented. Comparing reforms with the
help of the tools developed in this paper which allow combining vertical and
horizontal inequality concerns seems promising.
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Figure 1a. Growth Incidence Curve for global growth: average annual GDP per capita growth 
rates by decile, 1995-02 vs. 2002-07  (using 1995 as base year)
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Figure 1b. P-cumulative Growth Incidence Curve for global growth: average annual GDP 
per capita growth rates for p  poorest decile, 1995-02 vs. 2002-07  
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Figure 2. Global growth incidence curves: changing the base year of for 2002/07 growth 
from 2002 to 1995 (annual rates)
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Figure 3a. Anonymous (standard) vs. Non-anonymous Growth Incidence Curves: global 
growth, 1995-2002, annual rates
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Figure 3b. Anonymous (standard) vs. Non-anonymous p-Cumulative Growth Incidence 
Curves: Global growth, 1995-2002, annual rates
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Figure 4.  p-cumulative incomplete mean income 
changes X(p,q) for given p
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Figure 5a. Non-anonymous Growth Incidence Curve for global growth: average annual 
growth rates by 1995 decile, 1995-02 vs. 2002-07 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1995 Deciles (14 countries)
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
 
 
 
 
 
%
1995-2002 
2002-07
Figure 5b. Non-anonymous p-cumulative Growth Incidence Curve for global growth: 
average annual growth rates for p  poorest1995 deciles, 1995-02 vs. 2002-07 
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Figure 6. Projections of the p-cumulative incomplete income gain curve, X(q,p), on 
the q plane (p=.3, .5,.8; 1): 1995-02 (solid lines); 2002-07 (dotted lines)
(income gains expressed as percentage of 1995 income)
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Figure 7. Inequality corrected non-anonymous p-cumulative Growth Incidence Curve for 
global growth: 1995-02 vs. 2002-07 
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Figure 8a. Non-anonymous Growth Incidence Curve for global growth: average annual 
growth rates by 1995 decile: 1995-02 vs. modified 2002-07 
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Figure 8b. Non-anonymous p-cumulative Growth Incidence Curve for global growth: 
average annual growth rates for p poorest 1995 deciles, 1995-02 vs. modified 2002-07 
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Figure 8c. Inequality corrected non-anonymous p-cumulative Growth Incidence Curve for 
global growth: 1995-02 vs. modified 2002-07 
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